

**THE INESCAPABLE GLOBAL SECURITY
ARENA**

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FOREWORD

The common denominator intent of any terrorist group is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a society, a nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global community. The solution to the terrorism threat is not simply to destroy small bands of terrorist fanatics and the governments that support them. Additional measures are needed. That is, once a terrorist group is brought under control or neutralized, multifaceted efforts must be taken to preclude the seeds that created that organization from germinating again. Given these realities within the context of the contemporary global security environment, the United States has little choice but to reexamine and rethink national and global stability and security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.

In these terms, the author, Dr. Max Manwaring, seeks to do several things. He outlines the violent characteristics of the new security-stability environment and briefly examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem of governance. Then he analyzes the complex threat and response situation and outlines a multidimensional response to these problems. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military implications for playing effectively in the contemporary global security arena. His recommendations focus on the interagency arena and the military in general, and the U.S. Army in particular. By airing this range of geopolitical perspectives, the Strategic Studies Institute hopes to contribute to the building of a new, 21st century U.S. interagency and military strategy.

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SUMMARY

Global political violence is clashing with global economic integration. More often than not, the causes and consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be exploited by such destabilizers as rogue states, substate and transnational political actors, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, ethnic cleansers, militant fundamentalists, and 1,000 other “snakes with a cause”—and the will to conduct terrorist and other asymmetric warfare. The intent is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a society, nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global community—and, perhaps, revert to the questionable glories of the 12th century.

In these conditions—exacerbated by the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and by the devastating U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan subsequently—the United States has little choice but to reexamine and rethink national and global stability and security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.

To help civilian and military leaders to come to grips analytically with the implications of the realities of the contemporary global security environment, the author attempts several things. First, he outlines the violent characteristics of the new security arena. Second, he briefly examines the relationship of the central strategic problems in the contemporary environment—terrorism and governance. Third, he describes the complex threat situation. Fourth, he presents a basic outline for a reasoned multidimensional political-economic-stability capability-building response to these problems. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military implications for playing effectively in the global security arena. His recommendations focus on implications for the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.

THE INESCAPABLE GLOBAL SECURITY ARENA

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the global security system and the verities that shaped U.S. purposes, policies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. Cold War concepts of security and deterrence are not longer completely relevant. On the positive side of this change, we find ourselves in a new global security environment that involves the economic integration of free markets, technologies, and countries to a degree of integration and prosperity never before witnessed. On the negative side of globalization, we find ourselves in a security environment characterized by “unstable peace” and chaos caused by myriad political instabilities and destabilizers—some of which would reject modernity and revert back to the questionable glories of the 12th century.

Thus it is that global political violence is clashing with global economic integration. More often than not, the causes and consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be exploited by such destabilizers as rogue states, substate and transnational political actors, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 1,000 other “snakes with a cause”—and the will to conduct terrorist and other asymmetric warfare. The intent is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a society, nation- state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global community.

The solution to the problem is not to simply destroy small bands of terrorist fanatics and the governments that support them. The evidence over time and throughout the world strongly indicates that it is important to take additional measures. That is, once a terrorist group is brought under control or neutralized—multidimensional political-economic-security national development or

reconstruction efforts must be taken to preclude the seeds that created that organization in the first place from germinating again. In these conditions—exacerbated by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, and by the devastating U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan subsequently—the United States has little choice but to reexamine and rethink national and global stability and security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.

In these terms, the author seeks to do several things. First, he outlines the violent characteristics of the new global security environment. Second, he briefly examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem of governance in the contemporary security environment. Third, he describes the complex threat and response situation. Fourth, he presents a basic outline for a reasoned multidimensional political-economic-security capability-building response to these problems. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military implications for playing effectively in the contemporary global security arena. Recommendations focus on implications for the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.

The New Global Security Environment.

If the appropriate magic could be conjured and one could look down through the familiar artificial political lines and colors of a current world map into the 21st century strategic reality, one could see a complex new global security environment. That milieu would contain several types of ambiguous and uncomfortable wars—and their aftermath. A deeper look into that picture would provide several snapshots that inform an asymmetrical terrorist concept of conflict and war. A few examples would include:

- A vision of 26 ongoing high-intensity wars, 78 low-intensity conflicts, and 178 small-scale internal wars overlapping with the others. This picture would also show unspeakable human destruction and misery, and related

refugee flows, accumulating over the past 10 years. During the period since the Persian Gulf War, anywhere from 80 to 210 million people have lost their hopes, their property, and their lives.¹ The resultant political alienation, sufficiently reinforced by economic and social deprivation, tends to direct the survivors and their advocates toward conflict and the tactics of despair—terrorism. Snapshots taken all around the globe show this disillusionment and resort to violence and terrorist strategies from Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda to the USS *Cole*, Khobar Towers, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.

- A view of a vicious downward spiral that manifests itself in diminished levels of popular and institutional acceptance and support for weak and ineffectual governments and generates further disorder, violent internal conflicts, and mushrooming demands by various groups for political autonomy. These governance issues further translate themselves into constant subtle and not so subtle struggles for power that dominate life throughout much of the world today. This, in turn, leads to the slow but sure destruction of the state, the government, and the society—and hundreds of thousands of innocents. Finally, results of these dynamics can be seen not so much in the proliferation of a host of new countries, but in an explosion of weak, incompetent, misguided, insensitive, and/or corrupt governments throughout the world.

- In that connection, looking further down through the familiar and troubling world map, one can discern a number of fuzzy nationalisms that cannot be shown on two-dimensional space. Nationalist discontent, often accompanied by religious militancy, appears to be growing and dividing in an ameba-like manner as weak and incompetent governments fail to provide political, economic, and social justice; a sense of identity; and basic security for all their peoples.² In turn, these injustices fuel regional and global conflict, and related terrorist activities. One example that can be clearly seen is that of the ethnic

Kurds who happen live in four different countries—Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Turkey. Another more familiar example involves the mixed cultures and peoples who live in the Balkans.

- Similarly, one can see a broken pattern of emerging city-states, shanty-states, amorphous warlord-controlled regions, criminal anarchist controlled regions, and a “steady run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations.”³ These destabilizing situations tend to be exploited by militant nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious fundamentalists, ideologues, civil and military bureaucrats, insurgents, criminals, warlords, and other stateless political actors with an extremist political agenda—and the will to resort to extreme violence to achieve their ends. Again, this is a phenomenon that ranges around the world.

- An even deeper look into this new vision of asymmetric battlefields and ambiguous internal wars reveals the human suffering created by weak and insensitive governance that spawns disease, poverty, crime, violence, and regional, national, and global instability. Ultimately, this instability—along with the destabilizers noted above—leads to a crisis of governance and a downward spiral into failing and failed state status.⁴ This crisis is the consequence of some of the living victims and their advocates attempting to mobilize support for serious reform or to wage a sustained conflict against the perceived power symbol responsible for whatever instability that is being perpetrated. And, again, photos taken around the world capture this state of affairs from Haiti and Colombia, to Indonesia, and back to Zimbabwe.

- Lastly, with another adjustment of focus into the context of contemporary terrorism and the global security environment, one can see a psychological state of mind in individuals who have no understanding that hard work

leads to its just reward and where life inside a group or “gang” sharing a muddy bunker or a cold safe-house constitutes an improvement in physical and emotional security. In that connection, one can also see some of the emotions of these individuals. They include pure hatred for those with more or better of anything and pure contempt for those outside their own small brotherhood.⁵ As examples, Italian Red Brigadists, Irish Republican Army and Ulster Nationalists, and French and Spanish Basque militants are documented as thinking of outsiders as not really people. Rather, even supposed comrades only slightly removed from them have been considered to be nothing more than tools, pigs, and mere “shit.”⁶

This takes us back to where we began, to the fact that armed nonstate groups all over the world are challenging the nation-state’s physical and moral right to govern. This almost chronic political chaos can be seen propagating its respective forms of instability and violence in large parts of Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere around the globe. In many of these cases, governments are either waging war on their citizens, are fighting to survive assaults from their citizens, or have become mere factions among other competing political factions claiming the right to govern all or part of a destabilized national territory.

The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations described above is straightforward. That is, winning the military struggle against Osama bin Laden and his Taliban protectors will not end the threat of terrorism against the United States, or anyone else in the global community. This is because the Taliban and Osama bin Laden are not isolated cases. They are only one component of the entire global security problem that is a manifestation of a complex and potentially durable human motivation and weak governance phenomena.⁷

A corollary to that implication is also straightforward. When what mattered most in U.S. national security policy

were military bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, choke-points, and raw materials—and denying those assets to the Soviet Union and its surrogates—the United States could generally ignore internal conditions in other countries. But since the United States also is now interested in the need for nonhostile dispositions toward the country, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the capacity of other countries to buy American-made products, the continued development of democratic and free market institutions, and human rights—as well as cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, the environment, and the victims of natural and man-made disasters—then the United States and its allies must concern themselves with the internal conditions that spawn subnational, national, regional, and global instability.⁸

The Problem of Terrorism and the Related Problem of Governance.

The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, reminded Americans of realities long understood in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. That is, terrorism is a very practical, calculated, and cynical form of warfare for the weak to use against the strong. It is a generalized political-psychological asymmetric substitute for conventional war.⁹

The Bases of Terrorism. Contemporary terrorism is a lineal descendent of the type of low-intensity conflict seen in the Third World over the past 50 years. It is popular in part because the sorts of rural and urban insurgencies that proved effective during the Cold War are no longer as expedient as they once were. And, as the means of causing mass destruction become less expensive and more available, the angry, the frustrated, and the weak rely on more asymmetric forms of violence to impose their own vision of justice on peoples, countries, and the global community.¹⁰

Those who argue that instability and conflict—and the employment of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in conflict—is the result of poverty, injustice, corruption, overpopulation, and misery may well be right. Evidence demonstrates, however, that those problems tend to be used to divert attention away from local governance issues to somebody or something else.¹¹ In any event, it is naïve to think that instability and conflict will disappear until the deeper human and political realities that produce poverty and misery are confronted.

More specifically, terrorism and its associated asymmetry emerge when fragments of a marginalized self-appointed elite are frustrated to the point of violence by what they perceive as injustice, repression, or inequity. We must remember that it is individual men and women—government leaders, civil and military bureaucrats, and transnational corporate leaders—who are ultimately responsible for confronting political, economic, and social injustice. And, it is individual men and women—so-called terrorists—who react violently when a government or other symbol of power is perceived to be unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a given injustice. These individual men and women are prepared to kill and to destroy—and perhaps to die in the process—to achieve their self-determined objectives.¹² These individuals are also causes of terrorism.¹³

The Relationship to Governance. Because of the superior conventional power of a targeted government or another symbol of control, an illegal attacker normally finds it disadvantageous to overtly or directly challenge it. Thus, the assault is generally indirect and centers on a regime's moral right to govern, or on its perceived ability and willingness to govern.¹⁴

The underlying premise of this type of assault on a government is that the ultimate outcome of the confrontation is not primarily determined by the skillful manipulation of violence in the many military battles or

police engagements that might take place. Rather, the outcome will be determined by the relative ability of the violent opposition and the government to shift the “hearts and minds”—and support of a people or part of a society—in their respective favor. Thus, effective political-psychological persuasion coupled with political-psychological-military coercion on the part of the internal attacker leads to a general weakening of the state. The attack, then, is not against a regime directly. It is against the legitimacy of government. Weakening an incumbent regime is achieved in direct proportion to the deterioration of its perceived legitimacy.¹⁵

As a consequence, the intent of an illegal violent attacker—through persuasion and coercion—is to create the popular perception that a governing regime is not or cannot provide the necessary balance among political freedom, economic and social development, and physical security that results in peace, stability, and well-being of the peoples of a polity. Additionally, the intent is to convince a population that the violent internal opposition’s proposed political philosophy, even if it is as seemingly irrational as extreme militant reformism, tribalism, or warlordism, represents a relatively better alternative.¹⁶

In these terms, terrorism undermines the people’s faith in the political system, the state’s ability to sustain a healthy economy, and the government’s capability to provide a lawful environment for basic personal security. Terrorism also challenges the integrity of the country’s political institutions and creates increasing levels of instability. The objective is to destroy the political equilibrium of the state and facilitate the taking of political power to install the alternative system. As an example, the fact that “Islam” is a religion should not blind one to the fact that militant factions seek political power to impose alternative socio-economic-political codes.¹⁷

We should note that perception is the operative term here. Many quite legitimate governments face internal and

external terrorist threats. Suffice it to say here that this is not because of their lack of legitimacy, but because of their unwillingness to submit to the dictates of a given nonstate political actor. At the same time, a targeted government or symbol of power may be nothing more than a convenient scapegoat.¹⁸

In any event, the results of real *vs.* perceived moral incorrectness or malfeasance can be seen in governments unwilling or unable to provide basic services, to maintain decent roads, education, health, and other public services for *all* segments of its population. It can be seen in the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide basic personal security and functional legal systems that protect civil rights and a sense of societal equity. Illegitimate governance is also seen when disparate ethnic, religious, or other political groups in a society insist on establishing separate identities, and government reacts with thuggish and brutal violence.¹⁹

By transforming the emphasis of war from the level of conventional military violence to the level of a multidimensional political-economic-social-moral struggle, terrorists can strive for the complete overthrow of a government or the destruction of a symbol of power defined as “bad,” instead of simply attempting to obtain leverage and influence for limited political or economic concessions. In ironic philosophical rhetoric, terrorism turns Carl von Clausewitz upside down. War is not an extension of politics; politics is an extension of war.²⁰

Governments, international organizations, transnational entities, and other symbols of global power that have not been responsive to the importance of the legitimate governance reality find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face growing social violence, criminal anarchy, and eventual destruction.²¹ At the same time, the United States and the West confront a succession of failing and failed states, destabilized by internecine war.²² These

governance issues, then, are both causes and consequences of terrorism.²³

The More Complex Threat Situation.

In the context of disillusioned individuals violently reacting to root causes of poverty, misery, and general injustice suffered as a result of the policies pursued by their governments and the global community, there is not one single type of terrorism. There are many. The terrorist phenomenon threatens more than airports, railroad stations, malls, and buildings like the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Terrorists also threaten the stability and existence of governments, international organizations, transnational corporations, and the entire world order.²⁴

Internal War. Terrorist attacks against these kinds of targets generally result in some form of internal war. These small internal wars—low-intensity conflicts, guerrilla wars, small-scale contingencies—will likely have different names, different motives, and different levels of terrorist violence that will be a new part of the old problem. Nevertheless, whether they are called “Operations Other Than War,” “Teapot Wars,” “Spiritual or Commercial Insurgencies,” “Unrestricted Warfare,” or something else, future “small” internal wars can be identified by the lowest common denominator of motive.²⁵ That is, internal wars are the organized application of violent or nonmilitary coercion or threatened coercion intended to resist, oppose, or overthrow an existing government, or other symbol of power—and to bring about political change.²⁶ Regardless of what these organizers of violence are called—criminal anarchists, insurgents, guerrillas, or terrorists—they will likely use terrorism as a tactic or a strategy to achieve their ultimate objective of change or destruction.

Sooner or later, the spill-over effects of international, national, regional, intranational, and transnational terrorist destabilization efforts and resultant internal conflicts place demands on the global community, if not to

solve the root cause problems or control the violence, at least to harbor the living victims.²⁷ It is in this context that international organizations—such as the United Nations (U.N.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other regional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations—and individual nation powers such as the United States—are increasingly being called on to respond to a given conflict and/or its aftermath.²⁸

At the same time, the international community is increasingly expected to provide the leverage to ensure that legitimate governance—once regained—is given to responsible, uncorrupted, and competent political leadership that can and will aggressively address the governance root causes that created a given crisis in the first place. The main threat, then, to Afghanistan—or any other country that might be purged of terrorists—is a return to the bad habits of the past, and the possible creation or revival of some form of internal conflict.²⁹

Going Deeper into the Multidimensional Threat Situation. The threats in contemporary conflict come in other forms, both direct and indirect. A very visible form of a direct challenge to the state comes in the form of public violence against officials and institutions that are somehow defined by the terrorists as “bad.” An indirect threat usually comes in some form of progressive political and psychological discrediting of public institutions. The intent is to psychologically erode the basic public support that must underlie the legitimate functioning of the state. Moreover, a specific challenge to the state may be both direct and indirect.³⁰

As an example, the direct consequence of the 1985 Colombian terrorist attack on the national Supreme Court and the “assassination” of 11 of its justices “indirectly” caused that key institution to function even more slowly and less effectively than usual. This inefficiency led to a further discrediting of the court, to the inability to guarantee civil rights and personal liberties, and to the substantial

weakening of the state. In turn, the internal violence and dislocation of people exacerbated by the weakening of the Colombian state spilled over to its neighbors—and, thus, began to create regional instability. Interestingly, the perceived motive for the terrorist attack on the Colombian Supreme Court was simply to punish corrupt and indolent justices.³¹

Thinking Again about Threat and Response. In this connection, it is helpful to think of instability as a third-level threat to national or regional security. Root causes that generate political, economic, and social injustices may be considered a second-level threat to security and stability. The unwillingness or inability of a regime to develop long-term, multidimensional, and morally acceptable reforms to alleviate societal injustice—sooner rather than later—to enhance national well-being should be understood to be the most fundamental first-level threat.

At the same time, another threat emerges at a fourth level that is both a cause and an effect of instability and violence. That is, once a violent internal foe—such as Sendero Luminoso insurgents, Somalian or Southeast Asian warlords, “ethnic cleansers,” Sierra Leone’s armed pillagers, or militant fundamentalists—becomes firmly established, first-level reform and development efforts aimed at second-level root causes would be insufficient to control or neutralize a third-level (e.g., terrorist) threat. That third-level violent internal force—regardless of whether sincerely trying to achieve specific political objectives or only trying to gain some visceral satisfaction—can only be finally defeated by a superior organization, a holistic and unified strategy designed to promulgate deeper and more fundamental reforms, and carefully applied deadly force.³²

Some additional considerations that help to define the contemporary threat and to dictate response focus on the issue of ambiguity. In this connection, we find ourselves in situations in which the definition of “enemy” and “victory”

becomes elusive and the use of “power” to achieve some form of success becomes diffuse. Underlying these ambiguous issues is the fact that most contemporary conflict tends to be an intrastate affair. It is one part or several parts of one society against another. Thus, there are virtually no rules. There is normally no formal declaration or termination of conflict, no easily identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy, no specific territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no international legal niceties to help control the situation, and no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored. The new century marks a new age of unconventional conflict in which “Only the foolish will fight fair.”³³

In sum, instability, violence, and the use of terrorist strategies in resultant internal conflicts are pervasive in the world today. It is important, then, for the United States and the West—as the primary recipients of most of the benefits of global stability and economic integration—to do their utmost to protect and enhance the new order. In the interests of national and global security, the United States and its western allies have the responsibility to understand and implement the causal measures that bring stability and prosperity to the rest of the world. And that must be done before even more people become immigrants, refugees, or pensioners of the West.³⁴ In this connection, it must be remembered that an enforced peace can only provide the beginning environment from which to start political reconciliation, economic reconstruction, and moral legitimization processes.

Attacking the foreign internal development or reconstruction causes and consequences of instability and violence is no longer a matter of grace, of charity, or of patronizing kindness. Because of the very real threat to peace and prosperity, it is a matter of intense national and global self-interest. The conscious choices that the international community and individual intervening nations make about how to conduct national stability and

reconstruction efforts now and in the future will define the processes of national reform, regeneration, and well-being, and, thus, relative internal and global security, stability, peace, and prosperity.

Toward a New Stability Equation.

Finding solutions to the problems of security, stability, and peace in the current global security environment takes the international community, or individual intervening powers, beyond providing some form of humanitarian assistance or refugee assistance in cases of human misery and need. It takes international political actors beyond traditional monitoring of bilateral agreements or protecting a people from another group of people, or from a government. It takes these actors beyond compelling one or more parties to a conflict to cease human rights abuses and other morally repugnant practices, or repelling some form of military aggression. Solutions to the problems of stability and well-being take us to a new stability equation.

The fulfillment of a holistic legitimate governance and stability imperative consists of three principal short- and long-term programs that are necessary to free and protect a people from lawlessness, instability, and violence—and the aftermath of violence. These programs constitute a basis for a realistic and pragmatic “game plan” to pursue security, stability, and a sustainable peace. These programs focus on the circular relationship of: (1) legitimate governance to security, (2) the relationship of security and stability to development, and (3) the relationship between development and political competence. The intent is to build viable institutions that respond to the needs of a society and strengthen governance.

As a corollary, the three basic elements of a strategic stability equation (i.e., S) are: first, a military and intelligence capability (i.e., MI) to provide an acceptable level of internal and external security; second, the economic ability (i.e., E) to generate long-term socio-economic

capability-building; and third, the political competence (i.e., PC) to develop a type of political and corporate governance over the long term to which peoples can relate and support. It is heuristically valuable to portray the relationships among these elements in a mathematical formula: $S = (MI + E) \times PC$.³⁵

The Relationship of Legitimate Governance to Stability. Probably the most fundamental societal requirement regarding governance is that of security. It begins with the provision of personal security to individual members of the society and extends to protection of the collectivity from aggressive internal (including criminals) and external enemies—and, perhaps, from repressive internal (i.e., local and regional) governments. Personal security, in turn, is the primary basis upon which any form of societal allegiance to the state is built. Until and unless a population feels that its government deals with the personal security problem and other fundamental issues of social justice fairly and effectively, the potential for internal or external factors to destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable.³⁶

Corollary: Military and Intelligence. The military-police part of the equation is generally well-understood. Clearly, the military and police forces involved in a “national reconstruction,” “stability,” “peace,” or “counterterrorist” operation must be capable, as noted above, of establishing individual and collective security. At the strategic level, that entails:

- Establishing order and the rule of law, and freedom from intimidation and violence;
- Isolating terrorist and other criminal factions from all sources of internal and external support; and
- Sustaining life, relieving suffering, and helping to regenerate the economy.³⁷

The intelligence function makes the military element viable. Logically, the best trained, equipped, and most

mobile forces responsible for the achievement of the above objectives cannot do so without knowing precisely who the illegal organizational leadership is and where it is located. That requires an intelligence capability several steps beyond the usual. This capability involves:

- The establishment of unified national and operational intelligence capabilities that include the collection, fusion, and analysis for all sources of information;
- The active support of intelligence operations as a dominant element of both strategy and tactics; and
- An effective interrogation capability at the operational and tactical levels, as well as the strategic level, to take full advantage of human intelligence sources.³⁸

The Relationship of Security and Stability to Development. The international security dialogue is focusing on internal development and national reconstruction. That requirement equates to a holistic capability-building effort. The previous generally uncoordinated, piecemeal, and ad hoc approach to socio-economic development has been proven ineffective. Until solutions to development problems are addressed on a coherent and long-term basis, there will be no self-sustaining national development. National development provides the capability for the nation-state to develop the political and economic strength to provide internal order and progress.³⁹

Corollary: Socio-Economic Development. In the past, the world generally emphasized socio-economic development under the assumption that security and political development would follow. That has not happened. Coherent long-term, multilevel and multilateral measures must:

- Be designed to create and strengthen human and physical infrastructure; and

- Generate the technical, professional, and ethical bases through which competent and legitimate leadership can effectively provide individual and collective well-being.⁴⁰

The Relationship between Legitimacy, Political Competence, and Development. Another lesson that should have been learned that helps define an appropriate response to the problems of terrorism is that of the relationship between legitimacy, political competence, and development. Legitimacy is necessary to generate the capability to effectively manage, coordinate, and sustain political, economic, and social development. This capability implies the political competence to develop responsible governance and a resultant national and international purpose and resolve to which a people can relate and support. This capability thus implies the competence to legitimize and strengthen national political, economic, and security institutions. The degree to which this objective is achieved will define, more than anything else, progress toward viable stability and peace.⁴¹

Corollary: Including the Missing Key Political Variable. Because of the various systemic and other problems noted above, outside political help is usually needed to deal with a given stability threat. Ultimately, however, targeted entities must reform and strengthen themselves. What an outside power or coalition of powers can do is to facilitate the establishment of a temporary level of security that might allow the carefully guided, unified, and monitored development of the technical, professional, and ethical competence underpinnings necessary for long-term success in achieving a civil society and a sustainable peace. The necessary long-term political facilitating policies, organizations, and programs to accomplish a prescribed end game would, of course, be situation and culture specific.⁴² There are, however, multiple critical general points for a “facilitator” to consider. These key points are prescriptive and cautionary.

The facilitator should create a small multinational organization with a long-term mandate to do several things:

- Generate an enforceable, rational, prioritized, and synchronized set of milestones that will preclude piece-mealing and “ad-hocery”;
- Help institutionalize necessary processes for sustainable capability development;
- Provide evaluation; and,
- Develop national, regional, and international strategies to ensure the global investment in effective multilateralism.

The facilitator should also promulgate “self-help” legislation and programs to:

- Support peoples who are resisting violent solutions to internal destabilization problems;
- Develop competent professional leaders; and
- Fight corruption.

Finally, the facilitator must ensure that:

- All programs directly support the mutually-agreed prescriptive vision of legitimate governance and civil society; and
- Apply them at all levels.⁴³

Conclusion. The days of delineating a successful international security and stability end-state as simple short-term self-protection, limited adherence to human rights and the election of civilian political leaders, or material compassion for a humanitarian problem are numbered. More and more, the American people expect U.S. efforts, especially if they involve the expenditure of large amounts of tax dollars and/or the expenditure of American

lives, to make the world—and the United States—a better place in the long term.

Thus, the main element of U.S. foreign policy, military management, and public diplomacy in the current international security environment must go beyond the notion of democratic enlargement to that of a selective, long-term, patient but firm and vigilant pursuit of responsible and competent (i.e., legitimate) governance. This is not simple idealism. The concept of legitimate governance is a marriage of Wilsonian idealism and *realpolitik* that provides a pragmatic foundation for national and global stability and well-being.⁴⁴

Political-Military Implications for Playing in the New Global Security Arena.

In the complex and ambiguous global security environment, the definition of enemy and victory is elusive, and the use of power against a terrorist organization is diffuse. Underlying these ambiguities is the fact that contemporary conflict is more often than not an intrastate affair that international law is only beginning to address. But, even if it were, there are no certain means of enforcement. It is part of one society against another. In these internal conflicts, there is normally no formal beginning or termination, no easily identifiable military formations to attack, no specific territory to take and hold, and no enforceable legal niceties to help control the situation, and, thus, no specific rules to guide the political and military leadership in any given peace enforcement mission or “counterterrorism” campaign.

In this context, the problem of preparing only for a specific type of operation to respond to some form of terrorism or other type of aggression is mute—the situation may change, and the type of operation may become irrelevant. Experience shows that an enforced “peace” can only provide the beginning point from which to establish, protect, and sustain a legitimate civil government that can

and will deal effectively with the root causes that brought on the conflict in the first place. Otherwise, the intervening power(s) faces the unhappy prospects of either declaring victory, going home, and waiting for the inevitable relapse into the *status quo ante*, or risking taking part in little more than a static and sterile military occupation.

As a consequence, we must recognize that, in fighting a “terrorist” foe today and in the future, time-honored concepts of national security and the classical military means to attain it, while necessary, are no longer sufficient. Clearly the contemporary global security environment has become more complex, and requires the development of new concepts and doctrine that reflect the continuities and new dimensions of terrorism. At a minimum, there are three critical areas for interagency civil-military exploration and development: (1) understanding and dealing with the political complexity of stability and counterterrorist operations; (2) addressing and resolving the problem of ad hoc arrangements in strategic planning and coordination; and (3) developing a more mature stability and counterterrorism doctrine.

Political Complexity. The political complexity of contemporary stability and counterterrorist operations stems from the fact that internal conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in the world today are the result of careful political consideration and strong political motivation. Additionally, a large number of national and international civilian and military organizations and nongovernmental organizations are engaged in a broad political, economic, informational, and military effort to bring peace and stability to specified peoples. Thus, contemporary conflict is not only political but also multinational, multiorganizational, multidimensional, and multicultural. “Understanding and working effectively in that complex environment depends on ‘mind-set’ adjustments that will allow leaders to be comfortable with political ambiguity and

at ease as part of a long-term synergistic multiagency and multinational process.”⁴⁵

The political complexity issue dominates contemporary responses to man-made disasters at two levels—the type of problem and the cooperation politically necessary to deal with it.

- First, in internal conflict, a confrontation is transformed from the level of military violence to the level of a multidimensional political-psychological struggle for the proverbial “hearts and minds” of a people. Within the context of people being the ultimate center of gravity, antagonists can strive to achieve the Clausewitzian admonition to “dare to win all”—the complete political overthrow of a government or another symbol of power—instead of simply attempting to obtain leverage for limited territorial, political, economic, and social concessions in the more traditional sense.⁴⁶

- In this internal conflict environment, responses to direct and indirect threats must be primarily political, psychological, and moral. The blunt force of conventional military formations supported by tanks and aircraft could be irrelevant or even counterproductive. The more subtle use of “soft” political, economic, psychological, and moral power—supported by information operations, careful intelligence work, and surgical precision at the more direct military or police level—would be imperative.

- At the second multiagency and multinational leadership and cooperation level of political dominance, any given situation requires the greatest civil-military and military-military diplomacy, cooperation, and coordination. In such situations, responses must be well-organized, highly collegial, carefully coordinated, and conducted with considerable political skill. Otherwise, “strategic ambiguity” is introduced; “mission creep” is initiated; opponents are given the opportunity to “play at the seams” and frustrate objectives; friends and allies are allowed to

pursue their own narrow agendas; political, personnel, and monetary costs rise; and the probability of mission failure and unnecessary loss of life increases.⁴⁷

Until appropriate long-term political-psychological responses to direct and indirect terrorist threats in *intranational* conflict become reality and until realistic political-psychological responses to multiagency and multilateral coordination and cooperation problems in the contemporary global security environment become habitual, the United States and the rest of the international community face unattractive alternatives. In any event—as in Somalia—the time, treasure, and blood expended over the short-term will likely have accomplished very little.⁴⁸

Strategic Planning and Coordination. In this regard, hard learned lessons from the not-too-distant past are relevant and instructive. As an example, ad hoc problem solving and the convoluted strategic planning and coordination situation that developed in the early Bosnian experience was a consequence of a systemic disconnect between NATO operational and U.S. planning and implementing processes. It was also a consequence of the fact that the United States was not—at the time—prepared to work collegially between and among the U.S. civil-military representation, coalition partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.⁴⁹

At the same time, independent uncoordinated planning, called “stove-pipe” activities, produced operational and tactical confusion and required additional improvisations to fix command and control arrangements, mission limits, supported and supporting logistical and personnel procedures, rules of engagement, and status of forces agreements. As one example, on December 1, 1995, the Commander in Chief of NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) was assigned by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to command the NATO Implementation Force. However, the AFSOUTH commander did

not have proper authority to command U.S. forces or to resolve U.S. logistical, command and control, communications, and intelligence relationships. The resultant confusion and “strategic ambiguity” led to more quick fixes and contributed to the duplication of effort required to conduct operations. It also added significantly to the political, financial, and manpower costs of the unintegrated peace and stability mission in Bosnia.⁵⁰

Given such a convoluted multiagency and multilateral organizational and procedural situation, it is extremely difficult to make any kind of operation credible or effective. For multiagency, multiorganizational, and multilateral operations to achieve any measure of effectiveness, logic and good management practices call for organizational mechanisms to achieve a unity of effort. Creating that unity of effort requires contributions at different levels.

- First, at the highest level, the primary parties to the conflict must be in general agreement with regard to the objectives of a political vision and the associated set of operations. And, although such an agreement regarding a strategic or operational end game is a necessary condition for unity of effort, it is not sufficient. Sufficiency and clarity are achieved by adding appropriate policy implementation and military management structures—and “mind-set adjustments”—at the following three additional levels.

- The second level of effort requires an executive-level management structure that can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between the relevant U.S. civilian agencies and armed forces. That structure must also ensure that all civil-military action at the operational and tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the mutually-agreed strategic political end-state. These requirements reflect a need for improved coordination within the operational theater, and between the theater command and Washington.

- Third, steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and effectiveness by integrating coalition military, international organization, and nongovernmental organization processes with U.S. political-military planning and implementing processes. It is quite clear that the political end game is elusive and operations suffer when there is no strategic planning structure empowered to integrate the key multinational and multiorganizational civil-military elements of a response to a man-made disaster such as that in the former Yugoslavia, or that being faced in Afghanistan.

At a base level, however, unity of effort requires educational as well as organizational solutions. Even with an adequate planning and organizational structure, ambiguity, confusion, and tensions are likely to emerge. Only when and if the various civilian and military leaders involved in a given effort can develop the judgment and empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially, will they be able to plan and conduct operations that meet the needs and use the capabilities of the U.S. interagency community, relevant international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition civil and military elements. Unity of effort ultimately entails the comprehensive type of professional civil-military education and leader development that leads to effective diplomacy combined with effective military asset management.⁵¹

The Need for More Mature Doctrine. The need for more mature doctrine is made clear when every civil and military organization involved in multilateral situations such as those in the former Yugoslavia or Somalia operates under its own procedures or doctrine. To compound this problem, extant doctrine is generally designed to provide conventional military solutions to traditional military problems. There is no standardized doctrine for all levels in such operations, even within NATO. Moreover, there is little or no doctrinal recognition of the fact that responses to terrorist threats or to terrorist-made disasters are primarily multinational, political, and psychological in

nature. In that context, we are reminded, “We are operating with very old doctrine and legalities. These need to be changed and brought up to speed as soon as possible . . . Joint doctrine is good, interagency not so, and coalitional doctrine is virtually nonexistent.”⁵²

Difficult as all this may be to accomplish from an ethnocentric perspective, the doctrinal problem of bringing likely civil-military and international partners together on a level playing field must be dealt with quickly and completely. Relevant doctrine at the conceptual level for providing standardized direction and guidance for multilateral efforts must:

- Focus on the need to recognize the real locus of power (e.g., the civil population) in a given operational area;
- Deal with the civilian and military resources and time the stages needed to plan for and implement a truly successful conclusion to a given mission;
- Ensure early and continuous coordination in the assessment and plan development processes to establish mission responsibilities, supported and supporting relationships and limits, and for avoiding unilateral ad hoc reactions to contingencies;
- Permit the various cooperating political-military actors to plan, coordinate, and integrate their activities at specified stages of the implementing process; and,
- Ensure that conditions are established to allow a host nation to develop or renew its political solvency and legitimacy, and that a given mandate for peace and stability may in fact be fulfilled.⁵³

Implementing the extraordinary challenges explicit and implicit in the “new” global security environment will not be easy. That will require the entire U.S. civil and military interagency community to use its analytical and educational resources to flesh out concepts and doctrine

that reflect the continuities and new dimensions of terrorism. Additionally, that will require the interagency community to use its collective ability to engage and help likely coalition counterparts understand and develop these concepts and doctrine for themselves. Difficult as these requirements may be, they are far less demanding and costly in political, monetary, and military terms than allowing the “business-as-usual” and “crisis management” approach to work at cross-purposes with the reality of globalization and the necessity for global stability.

Recommendations for the U.S. Army.

As the U.S. Army transitions to deal more effectively with the realities and requirements of the 21st century, it must develop a greater capability to work synergistically over the long term in complex politically ambiguous situations. In addition to the requirements outlined above for the entire interagency community, there are seven doctrinal, educational, and cultural imperatives the Army should consider and act upon.

- First, the study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical cornerstone for understanding conventional war. It is no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. Thus, the Army would take the lead in promulgating 21st century concepts, definitions, and doctrine for key terms such as “enemy,” “war,” and “victory.”

- Second, leaders at all levels must understand the strategic and political implications of operational and tactical actions in contemporary conflict. The Army should take the initiative in educating leaders at all levels in the ways that force can be employed to achieve political ends, and the ways that political considerations affect the use of force. Additionally, the Army should take the lead in educating leaders at all levels regarding the challenge of “ambiguity” that they may be fully prepared to deal with it.

- Third, the Army must be at the forefront in the ability to recommend the application of all the instruments of national and international power to achieve maximum synergistic effect. In these terms, the Army should reconsider and refine the concepts of “hard” and “soft” power, as those types of power might be applied in terrorist-inspired conflict.

- Fourth, U.S. Army personnel are expected to be able to operate effectively in coalitions or multinational military formations. The Army, then, should take the lead in preparing leaders at all levels to interact collegially and successfully with representatives of U.S. civilian agencies, non-U.S. civilian governmental agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, civilian populations, and local and global media. As a corollary, the Army should also take the lead in revitalizing and expanding efforts that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness—such as civilian and military exchange programs, language training programs, culture orientation programs, and combined (multinational/multilateral) exercises.

- Fifth, regardless of the level of conflict, leaders, planners, and negotiators will inevitably operate at the strategic and high operational levels. The Army should take the initiative to nurture strategic leaders, planners, and negotiators. In this regard, the Army should also prepare these individuals to function in coalition decisionmaking and planning situations that can blend U.S. deliberate planning processes with concurrent multinational and multiorganizational practices.

- Sixth, contemporary conflict will continue to put U.S. Army forces in the forefront of “harm’s way.” As a consequence, the Army must prepare its personnel to be effective warfighters—and more. The President and Congress have and will continue to mandate Army forces to be peacekeepers, humanitarian assistance providers, law

and order enforcers, and who knows what else. In any case, given the diversity of missions in the complex and transparent security environment of 21st century conflict, American soldiers at all levels must be good soldiers. Additionally, they must also consistently and constantly display political-cultural sensitivity, considerable restraint, consummate professionalism, and iron discipline.

- Finally, the U.S. Army has a draft Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (100-20), *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, dated April 6, 2001. This doctrine should be promulgated as soon as possible.

The Challenge, Threat, and Main Task for Now and the Future.

A multipolar world in which one or 100 actors are exerting differing types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances is extremely volatile and dangerous. The security and stability of the global community is threatened, and the benefits of globalism could be denied to all. Thus, it is incumbent on the United States and the rest of the international community to understand and cope with the threats imposed by diverse state and nonstate actors engaged in the destabilizing and devastating political violence that is called terrorism.

The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that contemporary security, at whatever level, is at its base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to change from a singular military approach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational, multicultural, and multinational paradigm.

The ultimate threat is that, unless and until leaders at the highest levels recognize what is happening strategically, reorient thinking and actions appropriately, and are able to educate and lead their various constituencies into the realities of the post-Cold War world,

it is only a matter of time before the destabilizing problems associated with global integration on the one hand and global terrorism on the other will mortally consume one vitally important actor or another. By then, it will probably be too late to exert decisive influence on the situation and political-military chaos, criminal anarchy, and “uncivil” wars will continue to spread throughout the world. In the meantime, territory, infrastructure, security, stability, peace, and prosperity will be quietly and slowly destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of innocents will continue to die.

The main task in the search for security now and for the future is to construct stability and well-being on the same strategic pillars that supported success and effectiveness in the past. The first pillar of success is a conceptual requirement; that is, develop a realistic “game plan,” strategic vision, a philosophy, or theory of engagement to deal with terrorists and terrorism, and the human and physical disasters they create. The second pillar is an organizational requirement: the creation of planning and management structures to establish as complete a unity of effort as possible to plan and implement the philosophy. The third is an organizational and operational requirement. Organizationally, it involves developing and implementing the appropriate combination of political, economic, informational, moral, and coercive instruments of national and international power to pursue the multidimensional requirements of the contemporary global security environment. Operationally, it involves learning to understand friends as well as adversaries, and potential adversaries culturally, so as to better influence their thought and behavior. Most importantly, it involves training and educating leaders at all levels to carry out a 21st century “game plan.”

These challenges and tasks are nothing radical. They are only basic security strategy and national and international asset management. By accepting these challenges and tasks, the United States can help to replace conflict with cooperation, and to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise

that a new multidimensional paradigm for a peaceful and prosperous tomorrow offers.

ENDNOTES

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11. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, July 1981, pp. 379-399. Also see Caleb Carr, "Terrorism as Warfare," *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1996/97, pp. 1-12; and Walter Laquer, "Postmodern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996, pp. 24-36. Also see Bernard Lewis, "The Revolt of Islam," *The New Yorker*, November 30, 2001.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. This and subsequent assertions are derived from statistical tests based on author interviews with more than 400 civilian and military officials and scholars with direct experience in 69 internal conflicts. The effort was originally mandated by Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman during 1985-1986. It was subsequently taken up by Commander-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command General Fred F. Woerner, Jr., and others during 1986-95. The model predicts at an impressive 88.37 percent of the cases examined and is statistically significant at the .001 level. The model, originally called SSI 1 and SSI 2, has also been called the SWORD model. The SWORD Papers, although long out of print, are archived in their entirety by a private research organization, the National Security Archives, in Washington DC. Hereafter cited as *SWORD Papers*.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

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18. *SWORD Papers*. Japan's Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese Red Army factions appear to be somewhat repentant, but still active. Spain's Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) remains militant and closely tied to their French counterparts. See *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2001. Also, for nearly 100 years, a strong current of Latin American socio-political thought has been influenced by Uruguay's foremost literary figure, Jose Enrique Rodo. He as urged the youth of his country and the rest of Spanish America to reject the materialism of the United States and to cling to the spiritual and intellectual values of their Spanish heritage. These sentiments are strongly reflected in Latin American reaction to contemporary U.S. policy. See Jose Enrique Rodo, *Ariel*, any English or Spanish ed.; and Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. For more generalized treatment of the problem, see Mehio, Schwartz, and Friedman. Also see Niall Ferguson, "2001," *New York Times Magazine*, December 2, 2001.

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24. *SWORD Papers*.

25. "Operations Other Than War" is a U.S. military term and is elaborated in Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993. "Teapot Wars" is Leslie Gelb's term. "Spiritual and Commercial Insurgencies" are concepts developed by Metz and Johnson. "Unrestricted Warfare" comes from Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.

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